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Introduction 
Our lives are filled with open windows. Plenty of these windows are 
in our homes, schools, businesses, and other buildings, and they often 
have blinds on them that we can open or close, depending on our 
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comfort with what outsiders will get to see within the buildings. Not 
all windows are on buildings. Some of them are in our pockets. Some of 
them sit on our desks. Some of them sit in closed compartments of our 
cars, ready to navigate us to a new destination. These windows are 
electronic devices, and they can provide a myriad of information about 
our lives. While we voluntarily provide information to these devices in 
order for them to perform the functions we desire, consider the poss-
ibility of these devices seemingly acting on their own accord. Also 
consider whether the contents of messages sent through e-mail or social 
media to designated recipients are truly private. Imagining the startling 
image of a government agent reviewing your most intimate messages to 
your significant other provokes fear. 
This Comment is designed to determine when, and what kinds, of 
information should be reviewable by government agents through 
individuals’ voluntary actions. In order to do this, Part I reviews a 
recently decided case, ACLU v. Clapper,1 analyzing how the case would 
be decided as a Fourth Amendment issue, had the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals decided the case on that basis. Part II outlines three 
categories of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which will provide a 
helpful background to readers new to Fourth Amendment issues. 
Part III determines the outcome of Clapper using the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence reviewed in Part II. Part IV reviews pro-
posals to counter the pervasiveness of mass surveillance in American 
society, some of which come from the Supreme Court as well as 
academia. I also propose a solution, further delineated in Part Five. 
The Comment ends with a summary of the topics discussed and final 
thoughts on the overall subject. 
This Comment will show that the bulk collection of metadata from 
telephone calls and other electronic communications are permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution with-
out a warrant. However, disclosing the contents of communications to 
government agencies and operating devices without the consent of their 
owner constitutes searches requiring a warrant. 
I. Case Summary 
This Comment will begin by summarizing its subject case, ACLU 
v. Clapper.2 Doing so provides necessary background but also demon-
strates Clapper’s relevance in the overarching issue of mass surveillance 
in the United States. Clapper provides a springboard into difficult but 
necessary discussions about the constitutionality of domestic surveill-
ance programs. The Second Circuit’s decision in Clapper also provided 
 
1. 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
2. 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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momentum for Congress to craft a legislative remedy for the federal 
government’s metadata collection from telecommunications companies’ 
phone records, a remedy which will be discussed further below as one 
possible non-judicial solution to mass surveillance, should society deem 
privacy and civil liberties to be a greater interest than security.3 
A. Facts 
Clapper decided whether the government may require telecommuni-
cations companies to transfer telephone metadata in bulk.4 This begs 
the question, what is metadata? Defining what it is not provides a sigh 
of relief to many libertarians, for metadata does not include the voice 
content of telephone conversations. It does include other pertinent 
information, such as a call’s length, the phone number the call came 
from, and the phone number dialed.5 Occasionally, metadata reveals 
the identity of callers and the devices they use, through identity num-
bers related to phone equipment.6 In other instances, how a call is 
routed through the telecommunications network may reveal a caller’s 
general location, but when metadata provides this information, locat-
ional data is far less precise than that detected by cell sites.7 Despite 
metadata’s inability to replicate the most intimate information about a 
phone call—the contents of the conversation—it still may reveal a great 
deal of otherwise hidden information, such as intimate relationships, 
religious beliefs, perhaps even a person’s mental health (all by identify-
ing the individuals associated with phone numbers dialed, and the 
source of those numbers).8 
Judge Gerald E. Lynch, writing the Clapper majority opinion for 
the Second Circuit, acknowledged similarities between information 
gathered from telephone metadata and more traditional sources, like 
the addresses on an envelope. But he distinguished telephone metadata 
from traditional identifying information by emphasizing the “vast new 
technological capability for large-scale and automated review and 
analysis.”9 Though Judge Lynch does not state this outright, he is likely 
referring to intelligence services pooling vast quantities of metadata and 
then searching the metadata for individuals the intelligence community 
is interested in. Metadata is valuable for this task since, in a world 
closely connected by mobile phones, it is “virtually impossible” for 
 
3. See infra text accompanying note 38. 
4. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 793. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 794. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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individuals to avoid generating metadata through their normal 
routine.10 After reviewing the importance and pervasiveness of meta-
data, Judge Lynch transitions to the facts. 
The federal government determined that it could gather metadata 
on the basis of section 215 of the Patriot Act. This statute allows the 
FBI Director or his designee to “make an application for an order 
requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to 
obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States 
person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intell-
igence activities.”11 A now-infamous Foreign Intelligence Surveill-ance 
Court (FISC) order required Verizon Business Network Services, Inc. 
to produce call records, on a daily basis, of all telephone calls made 
through its systems or services where one or both ends of the call are 
within the United States.12 What makes this order infamous is that it 
was revealed to the world by ex-federal government contractor Edward 
Snowden in an article published by the British newspaper The 
Guardian.13 The federal government later acknowledged that the 
Verizon order was a small part of a much larger program collecting bulk 
telephone data launched in May 2006.14 This program began with an 
order, couched under section 215 of the Patriot Act, to produce “tang-
ible things” that the federal government construed to mean telephone 
metadata.15 
The Government explained the purpose of collecting bulk meta-
data: to fight terrorism.16 Phone numbers believed by the government 
to be associated with a foreign terrorist, based on a “reasonable artic-
ulable suspicion,” were searched within a massive database containing 
metadata to yield phone numbers in contact with the suspicious phone 
number, called a “seed.”17 A search would follow of all numbers found 
in the metadata to be in contact with the seed number, and searches of 
“the contacts of contacts of contacts of the original ‘seed’” telephone 
 
10. Id. 
11. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2012); Clapper, 785 F.3d at 795. 
12. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 795–96. 
13. Id. at 795. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions 
of Verizon customers daily, The Guardian (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order [http://perma.cc/42WP-3WGB]. 
14. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 796. 
15. Id. 
16. See id. at 797. 
17. Id. 
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number occurred as well.18 Responding to public pressure, President 
Barack Obama ordered the FISC to alter the telephone meta-data 
program in January 2014.19 
President Obama made two changes to the telephone metadata 
program. First, he only allowed searches of the metadata of phone 
numbers in contact with the seed, or first suspicious phone number, 
thus prohibiting searches of the “contacts of contacts of contacts of the 
original ‘seed’” number.20 Judge Lynch described this as limiting the 
searches to “two, rather than three” hops.21 The second change to the 
telephone metadata program required an FISC judge determine that 
the National Security Agency (NSA) satisfied the reasonable articulable 
suspicion standard before allowing a telephone number to be searched 
within the telephone metadata pool.22 
B. Procedural Posture 
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), New York Civil 
Liberties Union (NYCLU), as well as current and former Verizon 
customers, sued the government officials administering the telephone 
metadata program on both statutory and constitutional grounds.23 The 
complaint, filed in the Federal District Court for the Southern District 
of New York on June 11, 2013, requested that the court “declare that 
the telephone metadata program exceeds the authority granted by 
§ 215, and also violates the First and Fourth Amendments to the 
[United States] Constitution.”24 About two months later, the plaintiffs 
asked for a preliminary injunction, which would halt the government’s 
collection of metadata, quarantine the records already collected, and 
prohibit use of the records to perform queries into the phone numbers 
and other identifying information associated with the plaintiffs.25 The 
government moved to dismiss the complaint on the same day.26 On 
December 27, 2013, “the district court granted the government’s motion 
to dismiss and denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,” 
setting the stage for an appeal to the Second Circuit.27 
 
18. Id. 
19. See id. at 798. 
20. Id. 797–98. 
21. Id. at 798. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 799. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 799–800. 
26. Id. at 800. 
27. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows 
266 
C. Second Circuit’s Decision 
Once Clapper arrived at the Second Circuit, some preliminary 
matters were disposed of prior to the court reaching the merits of the 
case. First, the Second Circuit held that the ACLU and fellow plaintiff-
appellants had standing to sue because the “government’s own orders 
demonstrate that appellants’ call records are indeed among those coll-
ected as part of the telephone metadata program.”28 Appellants’ injury 
was the initial collection of their telephone metadata through the 
Verizon order, rather than a subsequent search of the data.29 The injury, 
seizure of metadata, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
because it prohibits illegal searches and seizures.30 After surviving a 
standing challenge, the appellants still had one preliminary issue to 
overcome before reaching the merits of their claims. 
The Government next argued that Congress never intended to 
allow targets of section 215 orders from seeking judicial review. In doing 
so, the Government stated that statutes keeping the metadata program 
secret indicated an implied Congressional intent to prevent judicial 
review for those actually targeted by section 215, such as telecommuni-
cations companies.31 The Second Circuit disagreed. It stated that “clear 
and convincing” or “fairly discernible” evidence must suggest Congress 
intended to preclude judicial review, and no such evidence was found.32 
The court further concluded that it found no unexpressed intention to 
withdraw judicial rights granted in a generally applicable Administra-
tive Procedure Act statute.33 Finally, the court proceeded to the merits. 
The court, confronted with a statutory issue as well as constit-
utional issues, began by determining whether section 215 could be inter-
preted to allow bulk collection of metadata by the government. The 
court stated “[t]he basic requirements for metadata collection under 
§ 215, then, are simply that the records be relevant to an authorized 
investigation (other than a threat assessment).”34 The problem with the 
government’s methods of metadata collection, as argued by the app-
ellants, was that it was not collecting evidence on a particular subject 
(an authorized investigation), but rather creating a huge pool of records 
that would later be relevant to a specific investigation.35 The court then 
 
28. Id. at 801. 
29. See id. 
30. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Clapper, 785 F.3d at 801. 
31. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 804. 
32. Id. at 805. 
33. Id. at 810. 
34. Id. at 811. 
35. See id. 
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concluded “the text of § 215 cannot bear the weight the government 
asks us to assign to it, and that it does not authorize the telephone 
metadata program.”36 The Second Circuit thus held that the telephone 
metadata program exceeded the power granted under section 215. The 
court acknowledged the “weighty” constit-utional issues brought up by 
the appellants regarding the telephone metadata program but did not 
reach them, having already held that the program was not authorized 
by section 215.37 Though Clapper struck down the telephone metadata 
program, the Fourth Amendment issues it presents are too pertinent 
not to analyze. 
This Comment’s purpose is to analyze whether, under current Four-
th Amendment jurisprudence, the telephone metadata program would 
be constitutional. Though this may seem like a moot exercise due to 
Clapper’s holding, as well as the passage of the USA Freedom Act, 
which restricts the NSA from collecting telephone metadata in bulk,38 
the presence of other electronic surveillance programs still creates a 
need to analyze relevant Fourth Amendment issues pertaining to the 
telephone metadata program and other forms of mass surveillance. 
II. Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment 
A. Fourth Amendment and Exclusionary Rule Refresher 
The ability for government agencies to access metadata, electronic 
communications, and conduct surveillance in general is governed by the 
Fourth Amendment. It states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.39 
 
36. Id. at 821. 
37. Id. at 824. 
38. Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring 
Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 103, 
129 Stat. 268, 272 (2015). This act restricts the production of tangible things 
(including telephone records) to the use of a “specific selection term.” Id. 
This is used to parse through metadata collected by third parties. 
Individuals’ metadata is still collectible and searchable, but the search is 
restricted. Erin Kelly, Senate approves USA Freedom Act, USA Today 
(June 2, 2015, 9:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2015/06/02/patriot-act-usa-freedom-act-senate-vote/28345747/ 
[http://perma.cc/YWP3-CQLS]. 
39. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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Note that the Fourth Amendment does not contain a remedy for 
unreasonable searches and seizures. When many people debate the 
federal government’s ability to conduct mass surveillance, you may hear 
a proponent of civil liberties implore the surveillance supporter to “[u]se 
the Fourth Amendment!”40 If the surveillance supporter followed the 
civil-liberty supporter’s instructions and read the text of the Fourth 
Amendment word-for-word, the surveillance supporter might quip 
“Who cares about whether what the government did was illegal? The 
constitutional text does not actually penalize the government for illegal 
searches.” What the civil liberties proponent should say is that the 
government’s action is an illegal search, but that lacks the rhetorical 
beauty of crushing an opponent under the awe-striking power of the 
United States Constitution. The Supreme Court, long after the original 
thirteen states ratified the Bill of Rights, created a remedy for Fourth 
Amendment violations. 
In Weeks v. United States,41 the Supreme Court ensured that there 
would be an attention-grabbing consequence for illegal searches under 
the Fourth Amendment by creating the exclusionary rule, which 
excludes from trial any evidence obtained by violating the Fourth 
Amendment, regardless of whether the evidence shows a criminal 
defendant’s guilt.42 While Weeks was a dramatic change in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, its exclusionary rule was not applied to the 
states until the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio43 in 1961. After 
Mapp, evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation could 
be excluded from criminal trials in either federal or state courts at the 
defense counsel’s request.44 With the Fourth Amendment text stated 
and the exclusionary rule reviewed, understanding the situations in 
which the exclusionary rule is applied will reveal whether the records 
produced through the telephone metadata program discussed in Clapper 
would be admissible as evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial. 
B. Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Many Supreme Court cases address the Fourth Amendment and 
the exclusionary rule, so there are many cases which may help a federal 
court decide the constitutionality of a telephone metadata program or 
 
40. Fox News Primetime Republican Presidential Debate (FOX News Channel 
television broadcast Aug. 6, 2015) (Senator Rand Paul used this phrase 
in the debate while discussing the NSA’s bulk collection of phone records). 
41. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
42. Id. at 393. The exclusionary rule also excludes evidence obtained by 
violating the Fifth Amendment. Id. 
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp v. Ohio incorporated the exclusionary rule to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 655. 
44. Id.  
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other broad surveillance strategy. A few groups of cases will organize a 
complex web of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence into rules which are 
easier to apply to constitutional issues, like the telephone metadata 
program in Clapper, which would have been analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment but for its ruling on statutory grounds.45 Subpart (1) will 
outline when individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy (with-
out focusing on information gathered by or through devices meant to 
record or transmit communications), subpart (2) will delineate the 
third-party doctrine, and subpart (3) will explain the property-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
 1. The Legitimate Expectation of Privacy 
a. Establishment of the Rule 
Virtually all individuals expect privacy within their abodes and 
property, yet privacy interests do not necessarily end at one’s property 
line or when homeowners cross the threshold of their front doors and 
expose themselves to public view. In Katz v. United States,46 the 
Supreme Court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”47 Katz transmitted wagering information from Los Angeles to 
Miami and Boston by using a telephone booth.48 Katz shut the tele-
phone booth’s door behind him when making the call to keep eaves-
droppers at bay but his efforts were futile: the FBI heard Katz’s end of 
the conversations by bugging the telephone booth with an electronic 
listening device.49 Bugging telephone lines was constitutional before the 
Supreme Court decided Katz because surveillance without a physical 
trespass and without the seizure of tangible objects was not considered 
a search under the Fourth Amendment.50 The Supreme Court discred-
ited this view in Katz. 
Justice Stewart, writing the majority opinion, stated that the FBI’s 
actions were unconstitutional because “[o]ne who occupies [a phone 
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll . . . is surely 
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will 
not be broadcast to the world.”51 Despite Justice Stewart writing the 
majority opinion, one of the most well-known rules of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence actually came from Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion in Katz. He created a twofold requirement that must be met  
45. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015). 
46.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
47. Id. at 351. 
48. Id. at 348. 
49. See id. at 348, 352. 
50. Id. at 353. 
51. Id. at 352. 
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before Fourth Amendment protection extends to potential evidence: (1) 
“a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” 
and (2) “the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”52 
In Katz, the defendant shut the door behind him when making a 
call in the phone booth, which reveals that he actually expected his 
conversation would be private.53 As for a legitimate expectation of priv-
acy, the court determined that society considered Katz’s expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his telephone conversation in a closed phone 
booth to be reasonable.54 Since the second prong of the legitimate-
expectation-of-privacy test assesses whether society deems the defend-
ant’s expectation of privacy reasonable, it is extremely malleable to a 
changing world and judicial creativity. It is the second prong that the 
ACLU relies on in Clapper,55 as they would want federal courts to rule 
that society deems reasonable the expectation that the metadata gener-
ated by telephone calls is private and, therefore, protected by the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreason-able searches and 
seizures.56 What is considered to be a legitimate expectation of privacy 
varies widely, with the unique facts of each case driving the legal 
conclusions. 
b. When a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy Exists 
Fourth Amendment issues exist in a variety of contexts, with 
household waste being no exception. California v. Greenwood57 exam-
ined “whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search 
and seizure of garbage” left on a curb for collection by a local garbage 
company.58 In Greenwood, police noticed vehicles would stop “during 
the late-night and early morning hours” for brief amounts of time at 
Greenwood’s home.59 Without seeking a warrant, police requested that 
the local trash collector pick up trash bags left on the curb in front of 
Greenwood’s home and turn them over to the police.60 Inside the bags 
were narcotics-related items, which convinced a judge to grant a 
warrant request to search the home, which contained cocaine and 
 
52. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
53. See id. at 352. (majority opinion). 
54. See id. 
55. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821–25 (2d Cir. 2015). 
56. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
57.  486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
58. Id. at 37.  
59. Id. 
60. See id. at 37–38. 
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hashish.61 Greenwood argued that the search violated an expect-ation 
of privacy because the trash was in opaque plastic bags that would be 
mingled with others’ trash and disposed of at the garbage dump, where 
linking the drug materials to particular suspects would be a near-
impossible task.62 
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice White wrote in the majority 
opinion that “[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left 
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, 
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public.”63 
Because Greenwood’s garbage was exposed to innumerable third parties 
beyond his home’s curtilage, the Supreme Court held that no Fourth 
Amendment protection extended to the garbage.64 Concealing garbage 
in opaque bags and placing them in a publically-accessible location 
disavows Fourth Amendment protection, but hiding illegal substances 
behind high fencing in your yard would prevent the substances from 
being viewed by the general public. Fourth Amendment protection 
presumably applies through the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test. 
So it would seem. 
Fencing protects against street-level surveillance but allows a huge 
opening for sky-based surveillance. California v. Ciraolo65 decided 
whether warrantless aerial observation from 1,000 feet of a fenced-in 
area of a backyard’s curtilage violates the Fourth Amendment.66 After 
receiving an anonymous tip that marijuana was growing in Ciraolo’s 
backyard, the police found that a six-foot outer fence and ten-foot inner 
fence around the yard obstructed their street-level view.67 Ever the 
creative bunch, the police procured a private plane, flew above the 
yard—in publically-navigable airspace—and photographed marijuana 
plants growing in the yard.68 A judge issued a warrant, and officers 
subsequently seized marijuana at Ciraolo’s home.69 No sane person 
thinks they are at risk of surveillance from above by the state, so 
Ciraolo’s case provided a chance for the Supreme Court to extend 
Fourth Amendment protection to fenced-in backyards. Not so. 
 
61. Id. at 38. 
62. Id. at 39. 
63. Id. at 40. 
64. Id. at 40–41. 
65.  476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
66. Id. at 209. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 209–10. 
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The Supreme Court equated aerial observation of a backyard to the 
neighborhood prowler watching you through a knothole in a fence, 
stating, “if there is an opening, the police may look.”70 Ciraolo count-
ered that his yard was part of the curtilage of his home, preventing 
warrantless aerial surveillance.71 Prior Supreme Court precedent defined 
a home’s curtilage as “the area to which extends the intimate activity 
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life.’”72 The Supreme Court accepted that Ciraolo’s fenced-in yard and 
its crop were within the home’s curtilage.73 But despite occurring within 
the curtilage of a home, the Supreme Court found the warrantless 
observations did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the 
observations occurred in public airspace without physical intrusion.74 
Since private and commercial flight in public airways is routine, Ciraolo 
lacks a reasonable expectation that his marijuana plants would be 
constitutionally protected from naked-eye observation from 1,000 feet.75 
With even areas shrouded by a home’s curtilage subject to warrantless 
surveillance, the police’s natural next step was to subject activities 
within a home to warrantless surveillance from a public vantage point. 
This opportunity came at the turn of the millennium. 
The story of Kyllo v. United States76 starts out much like other 
Fourth Amendment cases: the police suspected Kyllo grew marijuana 
inside his home.77 Unable to procure probable cause by viewing the 
home’s exterior from a public road, the police used a thermal-imaging 
scanner to measure the amounts of heat within different parts of Kyllo’s 
home.78 The police discovered a relatively hot area near Kyllo’s roof and 
sidewall as compared to neighboring homes.79 Police secured a warrant 
with the temperature information and discovered an indoor marijuana-
growth operation.80 The Supreme Court found a boundary to police 
observations from publically accessible places by holding that thermal-
imaging scans by devices not in general public use revealing details of 
 
70. Id. at 210. 
71. Id. at 212. 
72. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
73. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 215. 
76.  533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
77. Id. at 29. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 30. 
80. Id. 
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the home hidden but for physical intrusion were searches which require 
a warrant.81 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, clarified that the 
entire area within homes “is held safe from prying government eyes” 
and thus protected by the Fourth Amendment.82 But “visual observ-
ation is no ‘search’” according to Scalia.83 What Scalia seems to say 
with these seemingly contradictory statements is that activities occur-
ing within areas the human eyes could not see on their own are constit-
utionally protected. By adding the proviso “general public use” to 
devices that can detect activities occurring within homes, Scalia left a 
huge loophole open in his majority opinion future societal practices 
could exploit.84 This proviso will be re-examined below in a new light, 
as it can be problematic with applications like Skype and Snapchat 
becoming prevalent in our society.85 For now, two other categories must 
be explained. 
2. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine is analogically similar to the assumption 
of risk affirmative defense in that an individual puts himself at risk of 
a calamity happening to him. A baseball fan smacked in the face by a 
broken bat flying through the air is just one example of a situation in 
which the assumption of risk affirmative defense would be used by a 
baseball team defending itself from a tort suit. In the Fourth Amend-
ment context, the “calamity” which could befall an individual is for 
their information, freely-given under an apparent aura of confident-
iality to a third party, is disclosed to the government, which then 
initiates a criminal prosecution based on the information gathered. In 
Smith v. Maryland,86 the Supreme Court affirmed that “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns 
over to third parties.”87 Smith’s facts are crucial, as the device used to  
81. Id. at 40. 
82. Id. at 37. Kyllo, thus, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat 
output of his drug-growing lamps. Id. at 34. Admittedly, Kyllo is a tough case 
to classify in my three categories of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating 
to mass surveillance (those being (1) the legitimate expectation of privacy; (2) 
the third-party doctrine; and (3) the property-based approach to the Fourth 
Amendment), as it foreshadows Scalia’s reintroduction of the property-based 
approach. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
However, I decided that Kyllo was best suited for the legitimate expectation 
of privacy category because it highlights one of the few reasonable expectations 
of privacy that is considered a bright-line rule. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
83. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. 
84. See id. at 34. 
85. See infra Part V(B). 
86. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
87. Id. at 743–44. 
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gather the voluntarily-disclosed information in Smith works similarly to 
the telephone metadata program in Clapper.88 
Smith robbed a woman in Baltimore, but he was not identified by 
her initially.89 She then received threatening and obscene phone calls 
from the robber who once asked her to step outside, and at that time, 
she saw a 1975 Monte Carlo pass her home.90 The police later spotted 
the same car and used its license plate number to identify a suspect, 
Smith.91 To confirm that he was the source of the woman’s annoying 
phone calls, a telephone company installed a pen register—without a 
warrant—to record the numbers dialed from Smith’s home.92 Smith 
turned out to be the caller as well as the robber, and he was arrested.93 
A notable fact is that Smith used his home telephone to make his calls, 
yet the Supreme Court determined that his conduct failed to preserve 
the privacy of the numbers he dialed because he voluntarily provided 
the telephone company with the numbers needed to complete his call.94 
Similar outcomes have occurred in other contexts. 
Miller, a man suspected of operating an unregistered still, had 
accounts with two banks in Georgia.95 Previously, a warehouse rented 
to Miller caught fire, and the authorities found distillery paraphernalia 
in it.96 A grand jury issued subpoenas to the presidents of the two banks 
to produce all records of accounts in the name of Mr. Mitch Miller over 
a span of several months.97 The presidents complied.98 Miller’s case 
traveled all the way to the Supreme Court, which held that he had no 
protected Fourth Amendment interest in the disclosure of the bank 
records of his accounts.99 The Supreme Court determined that the 
account records belonged to the banks, not to Miller, and that the  
88. Compare id. at 741 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 
167 (1977)) (“These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the 
telephone numbers that have been dialed.”), with ACLU v. Clapper, 785 
F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[T]elephone metadata do not include the 
voice content of telephone conversations. Rather, they include details 
about telephone calls.”). 
89. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.  
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 743. 
95. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 437–38. 
98. Id. at 438. 
99. Id. at 440. 
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information in the records was “voluntarily conveyed to the banks and 
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”100 
Despite the fact that Miller likely assumed that the information about 
his bank accounts was confidential and to be used for a limited purpose, 
the Fourth Amendment was held to not prohibit the government from 
obtaining the records.101 While records created from bank transactions 
and dialed phone numbers are not protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, an even more critical issue for understanding the limits of mass 
surveillance is whether the content of conversations entirely held within 
a home or hotel room receive constitutional protection. 
Nashville was the site of a trial in which Jimmy Hoffa was convicted 
for trying to bribe members of a jury in a separate case, in which he 
allegedly violated a section of the Taft-Hartley Act.102 During this 
previous case, known as Test Fleet, a man named Edward Partin 
accompanied Hoffa and his cohorts in a hotel suite, hotel lobby, court-
house, and other areas around Nashville.103 Partin served as a govern-
ment informant as he stayed near Hoffa.104 Partin provided crucial 
information about Hoffa and his associates’ desire to bribe the Test 
Fleet jury members.105 Partin received access to Hoffa’s hotel suite, and 
by doing so, obtained verbal evidence against Hoffa’s interest.106 Hoffa 
argued that Partin’s failure to reveal his role as an informer destroyed 
the permission Hoffa gave for Partin to enter Hoffa’s hotel suite and 
constituted an illegal search.107 Nevertheless, Hoffa’s argument failed. 
Hoffa’s legal team implicated no interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment: “[Hoffa] was not relying on the security of the hotel room; 
he was relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin would not 
reveal his wrongdoing.”108 The Supreme Court additionally noted that 
Hoffa invited Partin into the hotel room and incriminated himself either 
directly to Partin or within Partin’s presence.109 United States v. 
White110 and Lopez v. United States111 came to a similar conclusion: the  
100. Id. at 440, 442. 
101. See id. at 443. 
102. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294–95 (1966). 
103. Id. at 296. 
104. Id. at 299. 
105. Id. at 296. 
106. See id. at 302. 
107. Id. at 300. 
108. Id. at 302. 
109. Id. 
110. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
111.  373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
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government need not procure a warrant when a government agent, 
unknown to a defendant, hides electronic equipment on his person to 
record the defendant’s words and then offers those words as evidence.112 
The Supreme Court summarized the dangers of conversing about 
criminal activities with others by stating: 
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and 
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he 
sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very 
probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or 
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.113 
The sum of the third-party doctrine is this: any information 
voluntarily provided to others is not subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection, no matter whether the information is exchanged in the 
public square or within the sanctity of a home. 
3. The Property-Based Approach to the Fourth Amendment 
The property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment seemingly 
disappeared in Katz.114 Justice Scalia held differently in Jones v. United 
States.115 In Jones, police attached a GPS tracker to the undercarriage 
of Jones’ Jeep while it was parked in a public lot.116 The GPS locational 
data showed that Jones frequented a stash house containing cash, 
cocaine, and cocaine base.117 Scalia determined that attaching the GPS 
to the Jeep constituted a search per the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment at its adoption.118 Scalia made this confident assertion by 
stating that a car is an “‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth] 
Amendment.”119 A distinguishing factor in this case is that Jones owned 
the Jeep before the government installed the GPS device on its 
undercarriage.120 This is different than police officers inserting a beeper 
 
112. White, 401 U.S. at 749; Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438–440. 
113. White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
114. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
115. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
116. Id. at 948. 
117. Id. at 948–49. 
118. Id. at 949. 
119. Id. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 
12 (1977) (“It is true that . . . automobiles are ‘effects’ under the Fourth 
Amendment, and searches and seizures of automobiles are therefore 
subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness.”). 
120. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (distinguishing the facts of Jones’ case from 
two cases that the Government relied upon to argue that what happened 
was not a search). 
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(locational transmitter) into a container before defendants purchase the 
containers, as that action, which monitored the public vehicular move-
ments of the suspects, was not a search.121 With Justice Scalia resurrect-
ing the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment in Jones, 
the relevance of the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test came into 
question. 
Justice Scalia helped clarify the importance of the Katz analysis in 
light of his majority opinion in Jones by saying, “[s]ituations involving 
merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would 
remain subject to Katz analysis.”122 The implication of this statement 
for Fourth Amendment issues involving mass surveillance is substantial 
and will be further analyzed below.123 Justice Scalia’s property-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment continued to evolve as he further 
opined on the matter in 2014. 
Florida v. Jardines124 determined whether a drug-sniffing dog used 
on a homeowner’s porch to sniff for contents within the home consti-
tutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.125 An anonymous tipster 
informed police that Jardines had marijuana in his home.126 Police noted 
no activity occurring around the home and decided to walk to the front 
door—with a drug-sniffing dog.127 The dog indicated that it smelled 
marijuana in the home, and this was enough information for a judge to 
issue a warrant, leading to officers finding marijuana.128 The Supreme 
Court held that because the dog revealed information which was within 
a home, its action was a search under the Fourth Amendment.129 Justice 
Scalia opined why the officers’ conduct was so inappropriate relative to 
implicit neighborhood customs. 
This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the 
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be 
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave. 
Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does not  
121. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the public 
movements of a suspect on roadways was not a search under Fourth 
Amendment). 
122. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (emphasis removed). 
123. See infra Part V(A). 
124. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).  
125. Id. at 1413–14. 
126. Id. at 1413. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 1417–18 (holding that the officers and the dog were on a 
Constitutionally protected area of the defendant’s home and thus there 
was an intrusion). 
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require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally managed 
without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-
treaters.130 
In contrast to the practices of door-to-door cookie sellers and 
Halloween candy seekers, police officers walking a dog close enough to 
a home to discover incriminating evidence without a warrant offended 
Justice Scalia’s view of how people conduct themselves regarding the 
property of others.131 The outcome of Jardines is very similar to Kyllo 
in that Justice Scalia thought that it was not a generally accepted 
practice to thermally scan a person’s home to reveal activities occurring 
behind the home’s front door and walls.132 
Besides labeling dog sniffs occurring on a home’s front porch and 
GPS devices attached to vehicles as Fourth Amendment searches, the 
Supreme Court also addressed whether tracking devices attached to 
people, without consent, constitute a search. Though Grady v. North 
Carolina133 did not determine the constitutionality of a sex-offender 
tracking program wholesale, it did declare that “[North Carolina]’s 
program is plainly designed to obtain information. And since it does so 
by physically intruding on a subject’s body, it effects a Fourth Amend-
ment search.”134 
With the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence refresher completed, 
the necessary ingredients exist to decide whether the telephone meta-
data program featured in Clapper violates the Fourth Amendment. 
III. Clapper’s Constitutional Claim Outcome 
The telephone metadata program in Clapper is constitutional 
because it falls under the third-party doctrine of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The telephone metadata program in Clapper works 
similarly to the pen register technology (capable of recording telephone 
numbers dialed) featured in Smith v. Maryland.135 The telephone meta-
data program in Clapper required Verizon to produce call records daily 
of all calls made through its system where one or both ends of the call 
 
130. Id. at 1415. 
131. Id. at 1416. 
132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Shades of Justice Scalia’s 
“general public use” proviso seem present in Jardines. Jardines,  
133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
133. 135 S. Ct. 1368 (2015) (per curiam). 
134. Id. at 1371. 
135. 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979) (explaining that a pen register records the 
numbers a person dials on their telephone in their home). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows 
279 
were within the United States.136 The ACLU may argue that the 
telephone metadata program’s systemic, nationwide reach distinguishes 
it from the holding in Maryland v. Smith v. Maryland. This argument 
will likely fail because, while the number of people whose metadata is 
collected is far greater in Clapper,137 the legal principle undergirding 
both Clapper and Smith v. Maryland is the same: a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over 
to third parties.138 
The ACLU could also argue that the telephone metadata program 
in Clapper differs from Smith v. Maryland because the telephone meta-
data program did not require physically installing pen registers for all 
Verizon account holders. This argument falls flat. There was no 
physical system needed to produce bank account records in United 
States v. Miller,139 but that did not stop the Supreme Court from ruling 
that bank account records were disclosable without a warrant.140 Smith 
and Miller speak to the proposition that when individuals perform 
activities that generate data points or willingly provide content to third 
parties, those third parties may then disclose that information to the 
government, and the government need not seek a warrant when 
obtaining records from a third-party source. 
The legal conclusion in this section is surely disturbing to many 
individuals. However, it is the correct conclusion, as it follows the third-
party doctrine. Not surprisingly, some have called for the revision of 
the third-party doctrine as a means of reducing the danger of dragnet-
style government mass surveillance. These calls have come even from 
the Supreme Court. 
IV. Calls for Reform 
Many different sources have called for reform of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. This section will feature three of those 
sources: (A) Justices of the Supreme Court; (B) legal academics; and 
(C) my proposed jurisprudential reform, which will protect individuals 
from some forms of government mass surveillance by preventing the 
government from accessing the content of individuals’ conversations 
directly, at least without seeking the consent of one of the parties who 
participated in the conversation. I call this the derivative-consent 
doctrine; just because parties consent to converse with each other does 
not allow the government to listen in to (or watch, if referring to a 
 
136. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 795–96 (2d Cir. 2015). 
137. See id. at 796. 
138. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
139. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
140. Id. at 442. 
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videophone conversation through an application such as Skype) the 
conversation as if a party also consented to that. 
A. Calls for Reform from the Supreme Court 
Some Justices of the Supreme Court have pondered the need for 
jurisprudential reform due to the increasingly electronic and non-
physical nature of surveillance techniques. Justice Sotomayor noted 
that “the Government will be capable of duplicating the monitoring 
undertaken in this case [Jones] by enlisting factory- or owner-installed 
vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.”141 She further 
stated that the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment is 
not as useful when dealing with electronic surveillance not dependent 
on physical encroachments on property.142 After discrediting Justice 
Scalia’s approach in Jones, Justice Sotomayor reviewed the dangers of 
the third-party doctrine, as in today’s digital age people reveal large 
quantities of information to third-parties.143 
The amount of information third parties receive about our goings-
on is dramatic. Justice Sotomayor further wrote that people “disclose 
the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the 
URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, 
and medications they purchase to online retailers.”144 But despite indi-
viduals’ willingness to conduct their lives in a manner which third 
parties may observe, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged that people 
likely “would [not] accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure 
to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year.”145 One solution the Supreme Court may 
implement in the future is to assert that individuals have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the information they exchange to third parties 
in the course of conducting their daily internet surfing, calls or texts, e-
mail addresses, and online purchase orders.146 
Justice Alito also wrote a concurrence in Jones. His solutions to the 
difficult Fourth Amendment problems created by electronic means of 
 
141. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 954–57. 
144. Id. at 957. 
145. Id. 
146. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(detailing the traditional legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test regarding 
third parties). Justice Scalia acknowledged that Katz would apply to “the 
transmission of electronic signals without trespass.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 
953. As society evolves, so will our privacy expectations. Id. at 955 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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surveillance are not through case law but through the political 
branches.147 Justice Alito highlighted wiretapping as an example of a 
difficult Fourth Amendment issue that was reformed through legislation 
instead of case law.148 Justice Alito explained why he believes the proper 
solution to electronic surveillance reform is found in Congress, stating 
that a “legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public 
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public 
safety in a comprehensive way.”149 
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence suggests the need for a juris-
prudential reform to change the third-party doctrine, seemingly based 
on Katz’s legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test, which is designed to 
measure society’s perception of when Fourth Amendment protection 
exists.150 Justice Alito’s concurrence supports a legislative reform to the 
electronic surveillance issue. The best solution may require a bit of both. 
B. Academic Perspectives 
1. Hosein and Palow Article 
A symposium article by Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow 
addresses some of the Fourth Amendment issues created by the many 
technological marvels that we take for granted.151 The pervasiveness of 
modern communications technology in our society is well-known. Those 
who choose not to use such technology “would be socially and economy-
ically” excluded.152 Technologies requiring remote access are well suited 
for the reasonable expectation of privacy standard to be applied to 
them.153 The cameras and microphones incorporated in many devices 
we carry present the danger for incredible intrusions into our conver-
sations, even potentially providing unwanted glances into our homes. 
Hosein and Palow discuss how cameras and microphones in computers 
“under the control of an offensive technology, could record . . . 
information about the computer’s surroundings, from private conver-
sations to pictures and video of the objects and persons who happen to 
be in front of the camera.”154 After outlining the danger that 
 
147. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962–63 (Alito, J., concurring). 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 964. 
150. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
151. Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern 
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance 
Techniques, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 1071 (2013).  
152. Id. at 1077.  
153. Id. at 1093. 
154. Id. at 1094. 
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microphone- and camera-equipped technology presents, Hosein and 
Palow offer a solution: 
If, while the computer resides in such a protective place, the 
government could not gain access to it without a warrant, then 
the government should not be able to install an offensive tech-
nology on that device merely because, for some fractional amount 
of time, it may be located outside of the protected sphere.155 
Working off Hosein and Palow’s proposed jurisprudential solution, 
consider this possibility. A law student, eyes glazing over from 
completing her law school writing requirement on her computer in her 
apartment, decides to walk down the street to get a much-needed 
caffeinated beverage at her favorite coffee shop. It contains a publically 
accessible internet network, and she figures she can continue writing 
her paper while sipping her drink. Unbeknownst to her, a fellow law 
student discovered that she had a strong interest in illegal horticulture 
and disclosed this information to the government. An agent, waiting 
for her to leave the protected area of her apartment, followed her to the 
coffee shop, where he used the publically accessible internet network to 
secretly upload malware to her computer. 
When the law student returns to her apartment, she places her 
computer in the same room as her special “plants” with the computer’s 
camera facing the plants. After she retires for a well-deserved rest, the 
malware within her computer activates, serendipitously using her 
computer’s camera to record images of the marijuana growing in her 
room. The images provide sufficient probable cause for a judge to grant 
a warrant, and she is arrested for her illegal marijuana growing. The 
danger Hosein and Palow warn of is the ability of a webcam to show 
the government images that it would not be able to, absent physical 
invasion of a person’s abode. Their article states that warrants must be 
issued for the type of situation encountered by our illegally-gardening 
law student.156 
Another issue involves the information that can be gathered from 
cell phones. International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) catchers 
impersonate mobile base stations, allowing mobile phones to be located 
and identified within range of the device.157 Although IMSI catchers can 
intercept content transmitted by mobile phones, Hosein and Palow 
 
155. Id. at 1095–96 (citation omitted). 
156. See id. at 1096 (“[A] person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of her computer, and in its ability to transmit audio, video, or 
locational information regarding her surroundings when those surroundings 
are likely to constitute traditionally protected areas such as the home and 
the office.”). 
157. Id. at 1097. 
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state that the content is protected by the Wiretap Act, forcing police 
to obtain a warrant prior to examining the content of communi-
cations.158 Another restriction on tracking individuals’ whereabouts 
through cell phones is if they enter their homes. The Supreme Court, 
in United States v. Karo,159 did not allow a tracking device (or beeper) 
implanted in a drum of drug-making ingredients to show the precise 
location—within Karo’s home—where the drum sat without a warr-
ant.160 Similarly, if an IMSI catcher indicated a cell phone’s location 
within a person’s home, that information would not be collectible unless 
the police obtained a warrant.161 Hosein and Palow’s analysis shows that 
it is possible that courts will restrict the ability of the government to 
track a person’s whereabouts at all times through IMSI catchers, while 
also arguing that the government could not install malware on a 
computer in a public place, and then activate the malware as it sits in 
a constitutionally-protected location, such as a person’s abode. 
2. Harvard Law Review’s Proposed Jurisprudential  
Solution for Mass Surveillance 
The Harvard Law Review shares the concerns that many others in 
our society have concerning mass surveillance. The esteemed scholarly 
publication especially worries that “when the focus of surveillance turns 
from monitoring a specific place to monitoring a specific person, the 
potential for uncovering the intimate details of that person’s life is 
substantially higher.”162 As a solution to preventing the government 
from gathering too much intimate information on an individual, 
Harvard Law Review proposes a two-factor test to determine whether 
enhanced observation is a search: (1) the intensity of the surveillance 
and (2) the state’s ability to synthesize the information collected to 
produce a particularized profile of an individual.163 
The reasoning behind this test is “to mirror the practical barriers 
that once constrained police conduct.”164 Additionally, the test counters 
the third-party doctrine because “economic considerations no longer 
 
158. Id. 
159. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
160. Id. at 716. 
161. Hosein & Palow, supra note 151, at 1098–99. 
162. Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Holds That GPS Tracking Is Not a Search 
– United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), reh’g and 
suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, No. 06-2741, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
8397 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2007), 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2230, 2235 (2007). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 2236. 
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stand as a barrier to widespread, intrusive observation.”165 While the 
rule proposed by the Harvard Law Review is normative, it at least 
recognizes the widespread danger caused by mass surveillance. But it is 
too difficult to measure. What one judge may consider to be soft sur-
veillance may to another be overly intrusive. There is a better solution. 
3. How Electronic Information is Captured  
and a Property-Based Solution 
There are other surveillance programs in operation besides the 
telephone metadata program highlighted in Clapper. One example is 
PRISM, a program that collects the contents of communications and 
other assorted information through internet-based service providers 
such as Google, Apple, and Facebook.166 The NSA, using PRISM, can 
access “email, chat, photos, stored data, voice over IP, and other 
information stored on participating companies’ servers.”167 Another 
surveillance method is called upstream collection, which means that the 
government collected communications passing through a telecommuni-
cation provider before they reached their destination.168 
If PRISM and upstream collection were not enough, another option 
is XKeyscore, which allows analysts to search metadata, the content of 
e-mails, and internet browser history, without even knowing the e-mail 
address of the person targeted by the search.169 Other information dis-
coverable with XKeyscore includes social media activity and browsing 
data.170 With an array of surveillance programs at the government’s 
disposal, there may be little hope of keeping any electronic communi-
cations truly private. 
Under Smith v. Maryland,171 it may be argued that any communi-
cations or data passed through an internet service provider does not 
constitute a search.172 One way to preclude this outcome is to pass 
legislation vesting property rights in electronic communications and 
 
165. Id. at 2237. 
166. Megan Blass, Note, The New Data Marketplace: Protecting Personal 
Data, Electronic Communications, and Individual Privacy in the Age of 
Mass Surveillance Through a Return to a Property-Based Approach to 
the Fourth Amendment, 42 Hastings Const. L.Q. 577, 579–80 (2015). 
167. Id. at 580. 
168. Id. The NSA established a room at AT&T’s Folsom Street Facility in San 
Francisco to collect all communications passing through. Id. 
169. Id. at 581. 
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personal information.173 Doing so would apply Justice Scalia’s property-
based approach to the Fourth Amendment as exhibited in Jones.174 
Bypassing a firewall or password protection to access content would be 
construed as a Fourth Amendment search if electronic comm-unications 
were considered property, as is stated in this proposal.175 But this pro-
posal could be problematic as well because it could chill work-place 
communications by scaring people from sending e-mails to sources that 
the original writer did not explicitly consent could receive such 
information. 
C. Author’s Proposal: Derivative-Consent Doctrine 
I agree that reform is needed in the Fourth Amendment’s juris-
prudence to protect individuals from mass surveillance capabilities. But 
the trick is in balancing the need to protect civil liberties with the need 
to secure the United States from threats, particularly those originating 
from overseas. I disagree with the notion that the third-party doctrine 
must be eliminated. Information voluntarily disclosed to others should 
be, in most cases, available for anyone to view, including the govern-
ment, without consequence.176 There are, however, some situations in 
which individuals did not turn over or create information voluntarily, 
but the government then decides to peruse the communi-cation anyway. 
The derivative-consent doctrine is designed to prevent the govern-
ment from accessing the content of conversations, as well as controlling 
or using devices, without another individual first revealing the inform-
ation or operating a device. The derivative-consent doctrine is best 
thought of as an alternative approach to the Katz legitimate-
expectation-of-privacy test177 and is not designed to eviscerate current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. What the derivative-consent doc-
trine is designed to do is prevent Orwellian-style mass surveillance from 
becoming a fixture in the United States. 
 
173. Id. 
174. Id.; United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
175. Blass, supra note 166, at 594. 
176. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. Note that the Smith opinion emphasizes the 
word “voluntarily” when referring to information given to third parties. Id. 
177. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
While I value the Katz legitimate-expectation-of-privacy test for its 
ability to assert Fourth Amendment rights based on how society changes, 
the test appears too vulnerable to differing outcomes based on political 
philosophy and ideological alliances. I believe a consent-based test is not 
as vulnerable to the changes in the ideological composition of the Supreme 
Court and general populace, and desire it to provide a baseline of 
protection against Orwellian mass surveillance no matter what part of the 
political spectrum controls surveillance efforts at a certain time. 
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Explaining the derivative-consent doctrine is best done through 
examples, though I will attempt to state it as a legal rule. Consent in 
the context of surveillance is best thought of as two levels. Level one is 
an individual’s voluntary assertion of consent. For instance, when a 
person dials a number or sends a text message that person voluntarily 
consents to the cell-phone provider recording the numbers, the length 
of the text or call, and other information pertinent for billing purposes. 
Surveillance performed at level one, in which individuals create meta-
data through their need to exchange information with a service provider 
in order for a device to perform a specified task, is constitutional under 
Smith and the third-party doctrine.178 
Level two is where Orwellian surveillance efforts go to die. Level 
two surveillance occurs when a provider discloses the contents of 
electronic messages to the government and when a device owned by an 
individual is hijacked by others (most likely through malicious 
software), allowing it to reveal information that otherwise would not 
have been seen or heard. Level two surveillance is explicitly outside of 
the third-party doctrine because information gathered through it is not 
voluntarily provided by the person the government is investigating.179 
Gathering information using means beyond a person’s voluntary acts, 
therefore, requires a warrant for such an act constitutes a search under 
the Fourth Amendment. 
V. Derivative-Consent Doctrine in Action 
Because the derivative-consent doctrine is more difficult to under-
stand when stated abstractly, I will use several examples to show the 
application of the doctrine. Not all of these examples will resolve 
themselves using the derivative-consent doctrine. Some examples dem-
onstrate that the derivative-consent doctrine is not meant to displace 
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, the first 
example comes straight out of Jones. 
A. The Phantom Activation of a Stolen Vehicle Detection System 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones proposed a hypothetical which, 
he insinuated, may conflict with Justice Scalia’s property-based 
approach to the Fourth Amendment. For purposes of this example, 
equate a vehicle’s built-in GPS navigation system with a stolen vehicle 
 
178. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
179. Id. “This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.” Id. (emphasis added). But note that the third-party doctrine does not 
require warrants to track the public movements of individuals. Id. See United 
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that the public movements of 
a suspect on roadways was not a search under Fourth Amendment). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015 
Derivative-Consent Doctrine and Open Windows 
287 
detection system. Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Jones, wrote 
“suppose that the officers in the present case [Jones] had followed 
respondent by surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection 
system that came with the car when it was purchased. Would sending 
of a radio signal to activate this system constitute a trespass to 
chattels?”180 Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion, also mentioned in 
dicta that this type of situation may not be a trespass, since the system 
was activated with a signal.181 While it is difficult to tell how Justice 
Scalia would answer this question, this is an example of a scenario 
answerable by either the derivative-consent doctrine or by Justice 
Scalia’s property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
The derivative-consent analysis works like this. When the car was 
on the dealer’s lot, it belonged to the dealer.182 At this time, the dealer 
could consent to the government activating the stolen-vehicle detector 
within the car, should it be stolen while the dealer controls the car. 
Once the dealer sells the car, the ability to use its stolen vehicle detector 
lies with the new owner. Suppose the owner’s spouse takes the car for 
a spin without telling the owner, and the owner assumes it stolen. The 
owner then activates the car’s stolen vehicle system, and finds that the 
car is at the local supermarket (the spouse took it on a grocery run). 
Information created by the voluntary use of the system by the car’s 
owner may be turned over to the government without a warrant. This 
is level one surveillance. 
To upgrade the surveillance at issue to level two, suppose that, as 
in Jones, police track the movements of a suspect. However, instead of 
attaching a physical GPS unit to the vehicle’s undercarriage,183 officers 
instead tracked the device by remotely activating the system, as Justice 
Alito’s hypothetical states.184 This is level two surveillance, and thus 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, because the system 
was not active due to the voluntary consent of its owner. 
Alternatively, Justice Alito’s hypothetical can be answered using 
Justice Scalia’s property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
Once the car (and thus the components within the car, including the 
stolen vehicle detection system) is purchased, it is the owner’s property. 
If the stolen vehicle detection system is remotely activated by someone 
other than the owner, this would also be a search that requires a 
 
180. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
181. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of 
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz 
analysis.”) (emphasis removed). 
182. Whether the car belonged to the dealer or to the car company that made 
it is irrelevant to the analysis because the outcome is the same. 
183. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
184. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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warrant, because the car (including its inner components) is an “effect” 
under the Fourth Amendment.185 Hijacking someone else’s property for 
your own use, without a warrant, should be impermissible under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
B. The Skype Friend Becomes an Enemy 
Skype provides a whole new world of communication possibilities. 
It is the darling of couples in long-distance relationships who seek more 
than to hear the voice of their loving companion, as it uses cameras 
incorporated within computers to show a person’s face on the other end 
of the call. Besides showing the person on the other end of the call, the 
image on your computer is likely to show what is immediately behind 
the person too. Besides warming the hearts of long-distance lovers, 
Skype video calls create interesting Fourth Amendment issues. 
Assume that a Skype caller observes a suspicious-looking plant 
behind the person on the other end of the call. The background image 
of the call indicates that the person on the other end of the call is within 
his home. After completing the call, the law-and-order minded friend 
calls police and reports that her friend has marijuana in his bedroom, 
located at address X. Police rely on the information voluntarily pro-
vided to them by seeking and receiving a search warrant. Police then 
successfully discover marijuana at the address and arrest the boy who 
was on the other end of the call. 
Unlike the previous example, the derivative-consent doctrine does 
not apply. The answer to this Fourth Amendment issue is an easy one: 
because the boy trusted that the girl he called would not give away the 
fact that he had a marijuana plant in his bedroom, the information she 
provided receives no Fourth Amendment protection, as it is subject to 
the third-party doctrine.186 
C. E-mail and Social-Media Messages 
The next example depicts whether the content of e-mail and social-
media messages may be disclosed to the government without a warrant. 
Before jumping into the analysis, a proviso is required. A social-media 
message’s contents are defined as only intended for individuals desig-
nated as receivers; they are not pronouncements for the whole world to 
know about. E-mails and social-media messages may appear to be sub-
ject to the third-party doctrine because they are processed through an 
internet-service provider.187 However, the derivative-consent doctrine 
provides a different outcome.  
185. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
186. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
187. See Blass, supra note 166, at 586 (“Smith made it such that surveillance 
and investigation involving collection or review of communications or data 
that have passed through an internet service provider, a precondition 
satisfied anytime the internet is involved, do not constitute searches.”). 
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A person sends an e-mail from his apartment, which has a private 
connection to the internet. The e-mail contains metadata, most notably 
the e-mail addresses of the sender and the receiver. The metadata may 
be disclosed by the internet-service provider because it is only level one 
surveillance. The sender consents to the internet-service provider using 
the e-mail addresses provided to send the message. This is obvious 
because the sender would not send the message if he did not consent to 
allowing the service provider to use the most basic information required 
in transmitting the message. Now suppose that the provider, instead of 
merely transmitting the message, decides to disclose its content to the 
government. This is level two surveillance, and constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment. Unless the sender consents that the 
provider also show the government the contents of the message, such a 
disclosure requires a warrant. 
Even without arguing that e-mails should be considered personal 
property,188 other constitutional jurisprudence dictates Fourth 
Amendment protection for messages or packages sent through mailing 
services.189 Letters and other sealed packages are “effects” under the 
Fourth Amendment, meaning “warrantless searches of . . . effects are 
presumptively unreasonable.”190 United States v. Jacobsen191 featured a 
damaged package that was opened by a third-party carrier.192 The 
carrier and DEA agents determined that the package contained 
cocaine.193 The Supreme Court held that the package did have Fourth 
Amendment protection, but lost such protection because a third-party 
opened the package, albeit because it was accidentally damaged by a 
forklift.194 
When individuals send letters, they expect those letters to remain 
private.195 It is illogical to conclude that messages sent through e-mail 
or through a social-media message would receive different treatment 
than that of physical letters and packages sent through mailing services. 
Moreover, e-mails, messages, and attached files are not damageable in 
“shipping” the same way that physical letters and packages are, so 
 
188. Id. at 586. If emails are designated as personal property, they would likely be 
considered an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
189. I define “mailing services” as the Postal Service, UPS, FedEx, W.B. Mason, 
and other similar parcel shipping and delivery services. 
190. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). 
191. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
192. Id. at 111. 
193. Id. at 111–12 
194. Id. at 111, 115. 
195. Id. at 115. 
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internet-service providers will not have the excuse that they opened the 
e-mail in order to transfer it to an unbroken container. 
The Katz analysis on its own may provide protection by analogizing 
physical letters and packages to e-mails, messages, and attachments.196 
But the derivative-consent doctrine provides protection that is not 
based on society’s perception of what privacy is,197 so it would be best 
to hold that under it, e-mails and social-media messages are not 
disclosable to the government without a warrant, unless the sender or 
the receiver consents that the internet-service provider also send the 
message to the government. 
While the derivative-consent doctrine reduces the voluntary power 
of third-party internet-service providers serving as information trans-
mitters to disclose information to the government, it more import-antly 
prevents Orwellian-style surveillance of the contents of electronic 
communications. No nation with an amendment protecting against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” shall force its citizens into a shell 
of secrecy.198 Doing so will harm our ability to conduct business, make 
friends, seek our soul mates, and conduct our lives without feeling like 
a shadow of surveillance falls over our every communication. 
Conclusion 
This Comment began by comprehensively reviewing the facts of 
ACLU v. Clapper. It then reviewed the text of the Fourth Amendment, 
as well as the Supreme Court’s remedy for violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule. What followed was an outline of 
three categories of Fourth Amendment cases: (1) cases concerning the 
legitimate expectation of privacy; (2) the third-party doctrine; and (3) 
the property-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. After 
determining that the outcome of the Fourth Amendment claim in 
Clapper would have been an assertion of the third-party doctrine as a 
justification for Verizon’s telephone metadata program, the Comment 
considered several solutions. 
Justice Sotomayor proposed that the third-party doctrine be 
revised because the metadata produced by mundane daily tasks is so 
great that individuals’ intimate associations may be revealed. She also 
argued that American citizens likely would have an expectation of 
privacy in the data their electronic interactions create. Justice Alito 
argued that a better solution for restricting mass surveillance would be 
to enact legislation restricting practices, such as the remotely activating 
theft-detection systems in vehicles, which could conceivably be used to 
track a person’s movements at all times. 
 
196. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
197. Id. 
198. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
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Besides the Supreme Court, a few solutions to the metadata issue 
were highlighted from other academic sources. Making sure that 
malware uploaded surreptitiously to individuals’ computers in public 
networks could not be used to turn on a computers’ microphone and 
camera was the focus of one source, as was the ability of ICMI catchers 
to constitutionally detect individuals’ public movements. Another 
source, such as the Harvard Law Review, created a two-factor test for 
surveillance, but I found the test easy to manipulate based on whether 
a judge has a civil libertarian or a law and order bent. Still one other 
source advocated that Congress should vest property rights in electronic 
communications. None of these sources provided a comprehensive 
solution. 
I proposed what should provide an adequate balance between civil 
liberties and security. My derivative-consent doctrine divides surveill-
ance into two levels. Level one surveillance involves information created 
by an individual’s voluntary assertion. This includes metadata, the 
information that individuals consent to provide to telecommun-ications 
companies or mail carriers in order to send messages to the intended 
recipients. Level one surveillance is constitutional under the third-party 
doctrine and does not require a warrant to procure. 
Level two surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. The contents of e-mails, social-media messages, as well as 
any information gathered about a person that he did not volunteer to 
provide is included in level two surveillance. Despite the derivative-
consent doctrine’s invention, it does not displace existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. What the derivative-consent doctrine does 
do is provide a supplementary method for thinking through mass 
surveillance issues that prevents the government from ever asserting an 
Orwellian-style surveillance system over the United States. 
An example of the overlap between the derivative-consent doctrine 
and current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would be internet-
service providers’ inability to provide the government with the contents 
of a message sent through e-mail without the sender’s consent, since 
the internet-service provider acts as a transmitter of information, not 
as a receiver of it. The third-party doctrine does allow a receiver of an 
e-mail to disclose the contents of the e-mail to the government.
 Constitutionally speaking, the result of Clapper should be the same 
regardless of whether current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence or the 
derivative-consent doctrine is used to sense its outcome. It is not a 
Fourth Amendment violation for telephone companies to disseminate 
metadata under the third-party doctrine. Telephone companies may 
also disseminate metadata under my derivative-consent doctrine 
because metadata is only level one surveillance, meaning that metadata 
is information that an individual consents to provide in order that the 
telephone company is able to complete the call. 
The technological devices surrounding us are like windows into our 
lives. With proper use, they can be of great benefit to our economy, 
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social lives, and productivity. When these devices are misused by forces 
and individuals beyond our control, they can open windows into our 
lives, revealing intimate details in a manner not much different from 
the pervasive surveillance scheme found in George Orwell’s classic 
dystopian novel 1984.199 The derivative-consent doctrine can close many 
of these open windows. 
Of course, any time an individual interacts with another person, a 
company, or other third-party, whether in person or electronically, some 
information must be provided to facilitate the connection. These are 
windows into our lives that we can control, just like a person can open 
or close blinds. But when another entity tries to open the windows into 
your life without your permission,200 the Fourth Amendment exists to 
quash these attempts and create balance. While a person hunched over 
their computer in a dark room with the blinds drawn and door locked 
may feel confident that the trail of websites he visits is known only to 
him, he is in for a rude awakening. But what confidence remains within 
him shall be placed in the individuals he communicates with. While the 
art of secret-keeping may not be highly valued in a society supercharged 
by the need for gossip, it is an art worth remembering for those you 
care about the most. The derivative-consent doctrine provides the 
needed Fourth Amendment protection that the content of our comm-
unication deserves. Finding the few friends trustworthy enough to 
guard our deepest and darkest secrets then becomes a higher priority 
than crouching in the shadows, hoping to devise a way to communicate 
remotely in a manner undetectable by our own government. 
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199. George Orwell, 1984 (1949). 
200. Not including situations when one’s presence in public allows others to 
physically follow or use devices to track your public position. 
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